

WRITING HISTORY
IN EURASIA
THE SOVIET STATE AND AFTER



Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute
of Asian Studies

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Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata

TOWARDS FREEDOM



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TOWARDS FREEDOM

AH-202, Sector II, Salt Lake

Kolkata - 700 091

Phone : 2321 2902, 9331030579

E-mail : towardsfreedom@gmail.com

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** Translated from Russian to English by Susmita Bhattacharya,
Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies and
Aditi Bhaduri, Independent Researcher and Journalist, Kolkata.

* Translated from Russian to English by Aditi Bhaduri,
Independent Researcher and Journalist, Kolkata.

Indian perspectives on the history of the former Soviet Union

Hari Vasudevan

This essay is intended as an introduction to the papers presented on approaches to history writing in the former Soviet Union which took place at the Maulana Azad Institute in February 2009. To achieve its end the essay seeks less to bring the points of view that were expressed than to provide a reference point on approaches in India to writing on the history of the former Soviet state, using these approaches as a means of highlighting some of the issues that were discussed at the seminar. It will fall short on both accounts. For the problems of history writing in the former Soviet space cannot be confined to a short piece; nor can the full gamut of Indian contributions at different levels in this area - let alone the experiences that formed them. But given the shortfall on the theme of Indian work, and the importance of the subject in the context, it was thought more valuable to undertake this exercise than to provide a standard introduction. To deal with the problem, and provide a point of departure for attention to the issues raised by contributors, the paper gives a broad account of Indian approaches, focuses on an important recent contribution by the Delhi historian Arup Banerji, and attempts to draw out some points for debate. But in dealing with this contribution, this exercise will not confine itself to this book either solely or primarily.

Indian writing on the former Soviet Union. Past and Present

Whether it is openly acknowledged today or not, it was a guiding principle of history writing on the Soviet Union in India that the work of Soviet scholars was considered representative of a specific perspective shaped by the conditions of the institutionalization of intellectual life in the country. What in a post perestroika and post disintegration era is regarded as the oppressive quality of Soviet intellectual life was accepted, with minor exceptions, in India, as a specific ambience with which there could be meaningful intellectual engagement. What today is regarded as history-writing that was gross

in its mendacity and exclusion, heavily prejudiced and far from true to professional history writing, was viewed as the product of a national and social commitment (however subject to corruption the system that this lived with could be). The commitment had attempted to establish common standards of political morality as a yardstick for all forms of behaviour that had a public edge – history writing being no exception. Just as it found the work of Boris Pasternak wanting on this score, it had its own rules for the evaluation of the evolution of the Russian state from the 10th century to the 20th, the nature of the Autocracy that evolved under Varangian and Romanov and the character of the Empire based on serfdom that extended from the lacustrine principalities to the Pacific. It equally had its own standards for the evaluation of the links between this Russian Empire and the Soviet Union that succeeded it and the histories of the different peoples and social strata that composed it and the socialist transformation to which they were subject.

There was no doubt that writing history in the Soviet Union was not the same as writing history in India – that the freedom with which archives could be consulted, the way in which ideas were bandied about in India could be replicated in the USSR. But equally, it was also assumed that this could not be done – and that in so far as it could not be done, there was a reason for it. Most Indian historians of Russia considered that the categories that were the reference point for the historian living in the USSR, (clearly shaped by debates in the CPSU and government) were terms and notions that required a degree of decoding – rather than as features of a vision of the subject that was to be taken at face value. Scholars who worked with Soviet research material understood that history in that country was required to educate at many levels – rather than focus purely on debates concerning the past-present continuum among specialists. And they considered that material produced under these circumstances required regard and respect as much as the output of a more specialized scholarship. This attitude was undoubtedly the consequence of the association of almost all historians of Russia based in India with the USSR's research bodies in one way or another. US or European work on Russian and Soviet history, meanwhile, was regarded as the product of a comparable ambience, i.e. hemmed in by considerations other than a concern with the issues themselves. Significantly, the Indian approach to Soviet work was not a far cry from the work of Samuel

Baron in the United States – who actively engaged himself with history debates in the USSR. Nor was it vastly different from some of the “revisionist” work on the Stalin era that came to find great interest in the 1980s.

If the situation were to be viewed ideologically, it might be argued that historians of Russia/USSR, based in India, were shaped by non-alignment. On the surface, they sought to find a space that existed in history that went beyond the prejudices of two sides. And it was a common comment of the time that there was a specificity to the “Indian point of view” for this reason.

Unfortunately, this was not so – and, in a large or meaningful sense, there was no “Indian point of view” – for this would have required a more active debate among Indians, a debate that was wholly lacking. But there was, certainly, an Indian approach which came from the specificities of working in the country. The ingredients here involved a basic sympathy for the Soviet enterprise – the reaction of a newly liberated state where revolutionaries had found regular support from the USSR. The ingredients also involved a low level of professionalization, since non-Indian history was seldom a point of reference. Libraries were poor – and, in comparison with other traditions, the engagement with the subject was weak.

Again, most institutionalization of the study of Russia in India was guided by the Soviet establishment, or the establishment of the Communist Party of India. The work took shape in Area Studies Centres of the University Grants’ Commission – which were dominated by those moulded by the Soviet establishment, even if the centres themselves were inspired by the Indian foreign policy establishment which had a concern with non-alignment. The sympathy for the Soviet point of view came to be a dominating feature of work of this era – and seldom were Indians drawn into a more exciting comparison between Euro-American and Soviet perspectives. In an era that was centred in Indian foreign and commercial policy on the Soviet relationship, the output of the research institutes reinforced the prevailing inclinations of policy makers – but it did so in an unquestioning manner and contributed to the lack of intellectual sophistication associated with non-alignment by the end of the 1960s.

The upshot for the post-disintegration era has been a wholesale lack of understanding of how to orient Russian history in India – or for that matter any history of the countries that emerged from the

former Soviet Union. India's foreign policy establishment, recognizing the necessity for a firm engagement with the independent states that have emerged out of the former Soviet Union, has encouraged the growth of a rash of centres and projects on Central Asia. Its main concern has been to understand the major factors that guide such states. It has been assumed that former scholars of Soviet politics will provide a similar set of inputs for Russia.

In the context, guided as Indian scholarship has been by the Indian political and bureaucratic establishment and its concerns, it has accepted the new mandate. It has accepted that earlier perspectives were flawed, jettisoned the legacy – and proceeded to seek out the perspectives and structures that guide developments in the former Soviet Union. Most of this writing unreservedly neglects the Soviet legacy – and accepts that notion common in all the successor states that the legacy was so deeply flawed that it does not merit attention.

But significantly, there is an important twist to this state of affairs. For unlike an earlier generation of scholarship that was tied to Soviet coattails, access to the output of the region has been problematic for scholars and students of the post-1991 period. A large volume of literature that attracts attention in India tends to be in English (inspired by Euro-American perspectives) or from the English-speaking world. Equally, in acknowledgement of the ascendancy of other languages as languages of scholarship, Indians are reluctant to rely substantially on work in Russian, viewing this with a degree of suspicion as biased, unless it is on Russia itself. In a dramatic reversal of the pre-1991 situation, Euro-American perspectives (primarily in English) have become the nodal point of Indian writing on the region. What is specifically “Indian” about writing on Eurasia, in such circumstances, especially in the writing of history, has become uncertain. The odd address of Indian foreign policy concerns in writing on contemporary politics is the only factor that distinguishes this work from most of the literature that is available on the region. Obviously, in history, such concerns will show themselves least, and we must look forward to a specificity that is determined by geographical location, access to material and the circumstances of local debate, where broader lines of historiographical concern and ideology will have almost no significance.

In the circumstances, the ability of Indians to contribute – except by way of individual effort – to the global awareness of Russian history has been limited. Like the schools of Russian studies in

China, they have played a negligible role in the “foreign literature on the history of Russia” which has always been a preoccupation in the former Soviet Union. This contrasts significantly with the discussions generated in the British, French, German, Italian, US and even Japanese academe.

Arup Banerji’s “Writing History in the Soviet Union”

The course of events in the USSR that form the background to this Indian story is well documented by Arup Banerji’s informative book on the formation of the Soviet establishment that regulated and restricted history writing from the Revolution, and his aside on the current debates on regulation by the Russian state of school textbooks. The book takes its orientation from an ambience in which the USSR commands little respect (except in the hushed whispers of comrades). It has very little in common with the sympathetic engagement of earlier historians of Russia, working from India, with the perspectives of the Soviet intellectual community. As with most writing of recent times, there is no concern with any explanation of Soviet policy in this area – rather the author is primarily preoccupied with the narrative of oppression and regulation in as firm and detailed a manner as possible.

A historian who has written knowledgeably on the Soviet Union in the past, Banerji is singular among Indian historians in that he has had no connection with the Soviet establishment at any time in his career, and its compulsions and priorities have never been part of his experience. Nor, in his professional work, has he felt any need to engage in public with Soviet perspectives on history. Mostly shaped as a scholar by Euro-American writing, he has used Russian sources (primary and secondary) for the insights they provide for debates that involve no Soviet tinge. The current book, therefore, is unsympathetic to its subject and makes no pretence of attempting to “understand” it (either through reference to dialogical method, discursive analysis nor structural examination). Its primary concern is a vigorous, and informative delineation of the way the Soviet state came to “make the past work”.

The book falls into an Introduction, five sections that deal with Soviet history writing and one section on the travails of writing history in contemporary Russia. The Introduction provides a first rate summary of the findings of a number of British/US historians – Davies, Black, Mazour, Emmons, Raeff and Baron especially - and one Russian historian published abroad – Litvin. From their copious

work, Banerji provides an excellent picture of the work of Tatishchev, Karamzin, Kliuchevskii, Soloviev, Semevskii and Miliukov (among others) before 1917, outlining the establishment of basic narratives of the Russian state and the division between Moscow and St. Petersburg schools over the nature of the scientific character of historical analysis. Succinctly, Banerji elaborates the division of opinion concerning the significance to Russia of Autocracy (Karamzin and later sympathizers), and problems of settlement and geography (Kliuchevskii) He points to the emergence of “socialist” perspectives against this background (linked to authors such as G.V. Plekhanov), and the formative years of the future martinet of Soviet history – M.N. Pokrovskii. Among “Marxists”, Pokrovskii together with Plekhanov and Trotskii (who cannot be classed as professional historians) attract Banerji’s attention among those concerned with social analysis.

For reasons best known to himself – but probably related to space and time – Banerji does not draw on Starr’s excellent accounts of the rise of ethnic and regional history in the mid 19th century – the best resume in English of this historiography – which “populist” historians in Russia seldom ignored. These provided the foundation for the Kraevedcheskaia Istoriiia (local history) as well as the national histories that took shape post 1917. Banerji also chooses to ignore the cluster of work around class and social stratification at the beginning of the 20th century (in the work of P.P. Maslov, Iu. Martov, Boris Veselovskii and others) outside the space of the University. Such contributions acted as the background to Pokrovskii’s confidence in asserting the Marxist perspective on Russian history, and may partly explain both his condescension towards the “masters” of the past and the vigor with which the new establishment pursued the task of creating a new generation of historians who were Marxist in outlook.

Establishing his basic narrative, Banerji points to a period when the growth of Communist Party dominance over history and the social sciences came to be gradually established – the 20s – when many members of faculty in Universities continued to teach, when a number of journals that addressed historical themes continued to be published, but where M.N. Pokrovskii’s Socialist Academy (renamed the Communist Academy) attempted to give a new lead in discussions of History and the Social Sciences,. This was the time when higher learning that was not associated with science ceased to be classified

into standard faculties of Law and History and Philology and when the Social Sciences came into their own, albeit initially with a degree of flexibility and openness. The Russian Association of Scientific Research Institutes in the Social Sciences (fdd.1921) had its own Institute of History – which was to stimulate the development of Marxist ideas. But this, Banerji points out, allowed a forum for exchange of ideas between Marxist and non-Marxists.

A less broadminded group was, however, gaining ground. They centred their activities around the Institute of Red Professors (fdd. 1921), the Marx Engels Institute (fdd. 1918) the Lenin Institute (fdd.1923), and they were to be found scattered in Communist Universities, the Museum of the Revolution and the Society of Former Political Prisoners and Political Exiles. The hard core Marxist historian took his cue from Pokrovskii's Society of Marxist Historians (fdd. 1925).

The range and scope of what was transpiring was varied and uneven. For History as a subject was not taught at schools in the 20s, and Soviet institutions of higher learning avoided the granting of degrees during this period. It was around the products and participants of the avowedly Marxist bodies associated with history that from 1929 a new institutionalized space for the teaching and understanding of history took shape. History was reintroduced in schools – and the Soviet diploma established itself in the 1930s, along with the range of titles and degrees that were to become characteristic of the Academy of Sciences and the University.

Banerji uses a series of Western sources to underline the brutality and dogmatism of what followed (the work of Black, Fitzpatrick, and, more centrally, Marwick). John Barber's writing on M.N. Pokrovskii is central to this section.

The "attack" on the more flexible and open dispensation of the 20s, Banerji shows, began with Pokrovskii's attack on non-Marxist historians during the All Union Conference of Marxist Historians (28th December 1928 – 4th January 1929). Liquidation of the Institute of History belonging to the Russian Association of Scientific Research Institutes in the Social Sciences followed – and many bodies were subordinated to the Communist Academy.

But this was only the beginning. For, in 1931 there were arrests, imprisonment and execution of many historians. Pivotal was Stalin's letter to the journal *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia* in 1931 which demanded a more purist attitude to history. This intervention was followed by

concentration by 1931 of all history research around the Communist Academy, the Marx-Engels Institute and the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. In a long aside on Pokrovskii (substantially dependent on Barber's work) Banerji outlines how the martinet became the victim of the new era – as did his thesis concerning the centrality of “commercial capitalism” in Russian history. A sanitized history of the USSR – which was soft on the continuity between the Russian Empire and the Soviet state was prepared for popular dissemination by 1937. This was Shestakov's Short Course on the History of Russia – which not only dealt with the progressive quality of the Russian Revolution but also found space for the value of the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The increasing focus on the history of Russia – to the neglect of the histories of other nationalities – was a feature of this time.

Banerji concludes this chapter with important narratives of continued regulation of history under the later Soviet state when S.P. Trapeznikov straitjacketed history writing in his own way. He touches on the “thaw” of the early Khrushchev era through reference to the opening of important archives on the Soviet state at the time. But he does not find it worthwhile (presumably because it did not affect the history of Soviet Russia, with which he is primarily concerned) to mention the stimulating debates of the 20th Party Congress era which led to a genuine professionalization of Soviet history writing as it contended with archives and sources as never before. The summary dismissal of the Brezhnev era in four pages – even as it featured the first Soviet engagements with econometrics in the writing of economic history (in the work of I.D. Koval'chenko), the outstanding archival work of Peter Zaionchkovskii, Larissa Zakharova, V.S. Diakin, Valerii Bovykin, A.M. Anfimov, N.M. Pirumova, to mention only a few, reflect the equally summary dismissal of this entire era in US and British accounts that seldom concerned itself with the achievement and were dominated by the deadening hand of Richard Pipes, Leonard Shapiro and many sympathetic directly or indirectly to their views. Equally ignored in Western writing (except by way of dismissal) were the great national history projects of the time (of the various republics and autonomies), each dragging with it a vast archival baggage. It has been this literature that has formed the foundation of historical sensibility in the post Soviet era in the successor states, however regimented and anodyne its content.

Given that there has been no mention of this Brezhnev literature,

the ability of the Soviet historical community to produce the exciting debates of glasnost' and the Gorbachev years, which draw attention in Banerji's second chapter, comes as a surprise. But the chapter provides an excellent recitation of the debates – and the way in which they recast crucial issues relating to the outbreak of the Collectivization, the Stalin era, lead up to the Second World War, and the Katyn Massacres. Equally useful and broad-ranging is Banerji's original account of the differences between different party histories (Chapter 3) and the contrast between Western and Soviet histories on crucial issues (Chapter 4).

A final leap into the continuities between Soviet regimentation of the historian and Russian regimentation of history, bearing in mind the archive and the classroom (Chapters 5 and 6) provide interesting essays which, unfortunately, neglect all that is not regimented and all that remains outside the ambit of the post-Soviet state in Russia. The chapter on archives traces the considerable impediments placed in the way of scholars when they used the archival system in the Soviet era and the destruction of material. But it fails even to point to the quantum of material of the most sensitive type that has survived, neglecting to tackle the range of the range of successful Western experience (seen in the work of Patricia Grimsted who produced some of the best introductions to the Soviet archives in the 70s and 80s) let alone the experience of Soviet scholars. It also then deals with the transfer of material into restricted access under the current Russian government – and the problems of working within such archives (e.g. the President's Archive). This fails to draw attention to the vast areas of the archival system outside these confines and the ease with which private libraries and archives may be used currently.

In this and in his evaluations of the Brezhnev era, it is not that, in following western sources, Banerji produces an essentially false picture. It is merely that he refuses to acknowledge what only the most radical Sovietophobes in the west would refuse to see in the past and what the most extreme of democrats refuse to see in Russia in the present. This is that having created a specific relationship between the state and the production of history, Soviet government made of it an area of negotiation with those who wished to know – providing concessions to greater and lesser degrees as it went along. Having made almost everything available after 1991, the Russian state attempted to establish caution in fixed domains rather than change the rules of the game once again.

Indian lives in history-writing on Russia

Significantly, it was in the very space provided by what goes unmentioned in Banerji's narrative (the negotiations that made up the production of later Soviet history) that Indian historians found their way in the pre-disintegration (and for that matter, pre-perestroika) era into independent endeavours that were undoubtedly useful to scholarship in general. And equally significantly, this continues to be the case in Indian writing on the history of the former Soviet Union today. In doing this, Indian scholars faced a situation similar to their Euro-American partners in that they were subject to the standard restrictions that encumbered foreigners (limited access to archival inventories or opisi, special segregated reading rooms, special vetting for permission to do advanced work etc.)

But Indians were not to be compared with Euro-American scholars who made the "negotiation" mentioned above at other levels. They did not work within a framework of analysis that questioned the assumptions of the Soviet regime. Rather they restricted their focus to an even handed evaluation of sources to pull together narratives on important themes. They had a considerable advantage. In most cases, in coming to their subject, they carried a sympathy for the regime they faced, even though not guided by its system and assumptions. A range of literature in India over the decades prior to Independence in 1947, in Indian languages as well as English, which was tantamount to a hagiography of the Revolution, Soviet Russia and its leaders, stimulated such sympathy.

Central Asia was a crucial area of focus. And three historians at different times engaged with the history of the region. Of these, R. Vaidyanathan was probably to be the most successful of these, but in terms of long term impact on the scholarly establishment in India,² Devendra Kaushik stands out. Both undertook their work in the mid 1960s, Vaidyanathan working out of Moscow, while Kaushik did his research in Tashkent. Through careful source work, Vaidyanathan not only brought together a sense of published literature that outclassed his contemporaries in the west (Bennigsen and Carrere d'Encausse) on the subject of the establishment of Soviet authority in Central Asia. He was able to suggest not only the value of the insights of Soviet scholars while going beyond this to map the range and power of their opponents. Vaidyanathan's sense of fair play, together with his clear left leanings ensured him access to classified material. He was able to establish the most valuable section of the

old library of Russian books at the School of International Studies, before he quit academic work for personal reasons in the early 70s.

Less equivocal in his evaluations, but equally successful in his negotiations, Devendra Kaushik, a staunch opponent of Vaidyanathan's, assembled his sources in Tashkent, and established his credentials to speak for them through a straightforward assertion of his doctrinaire Marxism.³ Using links and connections that he made during his long stay in the Soviet Union, Kaushik gained access to a range of sources, and used them to state a case on Central Asia in India that mirrored standard Soviet views. Thereafter, he became a staunch supporter in India of the Soviet academic tradition, working with a variety of publications and University departments, promoting research in Indo-Soviet and Indo-Russian relations.

It goes without saying that both Vaidyanathan and Kaushik knew excellent Russian, being schooled in the language in Moscow, were able to freely handle their sources and exchange views with the best of Soviet historians. The same must be said of a later entrant into the field – Padmalochan Dash, who worked on early Soviet Tajikistan in the 1970s from PFU in Moscow.⁴ Dealing with a more sensitive era, where access to archives was more rare, Dash was given more restricted access to classified material and required to use published sources primarily for his research.

The only other major historian trained in India around this time (younger than Vaidyanathan and Kaushik but older to Dash) was Nirmala Joshi – who possessed all the same attributes of Vaidyanathan and Kaushik, and went through similar training. She used the advantages of her subject (Indo-Russian relations), which was in no way sensitive in the Soviet landscape of history themes, to produce a highly competent dissertation that provides substantial information from published and unpublished sources.⁵

Coming from a very different background was the JNU historian Madhavan Palat, who completed his research from Oxford in 1973 and specialized in the history of Russian labour. Initially trained in history in Delhi, Palat graduated through studies at Cambridge and Oxford, to focus on pre-revolutionary Russian history. He acquired his knowledge of Russian in Britain, but used the Indo-Soviet connection to substantial research time in Moscow. Working with the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, Palat gained substantial access to Russian archives, and produced a major dissertation on labour insurance in Tsarist Russia and an essay on

the Zubatov movement that is a major contribution to scholarship. Significantly, though not a Communist, like Vaidyanathan, Palat established a close rapport with Soviet academics of his time, steered clear of a contest with established orthodoxies in the USSR, drawing attention to the substantial achievements of important scholars (such as Diakin and Avrekh), in historical literature in India.⁶ He was not associated with the Area Studies paradigm, but worked within a History faculty. And he attempted comparative analysis in his approach to labour as well as his later work on Russian Imperialism.

It may be mentioned that Banerji and the author of this article, engaging with this situation in the late 1970s and thereafter adopted different approaches to the landmarks that existed in India.⁷ Banerji, initially trained in the UK and completing his work from JNU, was never placed in a position where he could consult Soviet archives. Perhaps correctly, while undertaking his work, he also assumed that the Indian ambience was not worth the engagement and pitched his work within the framework of Euro-American work, producing a first class history of private trade during NEP. The author of this article, consciously guided by principles of non-alignment, after initial work on the pre-1905 political and institutional history in the UK, and having restricted access to Soviet archives in the 70s, focused on the comparative strengths of Soviet and non-Soviet writing on the history of pre-Revolutionary agriculture.

Inputs into the environment in which these historians came from a variety of sources. These sources include: Imam, a historian trained in SOAS and many scholars from other disciplines, including Dasgupta (Soviet trained) in Pune in economics, Giddhadhubli (Soviet trained) in Bombay in economics, Vyas (UK trained in economics), Cheney (US trained) and R.R. Sharma (Sweden trained) in politics and international relations, Patnaik (JNU trained, Central Asian studies) as well as the language and literature inputs of a range of Russianists (Mukherji, Chakravarty, Sahni, Dimry, Basu, Roy etc., all Soviet trained) and their students. And in the circumstances, the history that evolved in India should have developed increasing complexity. But this was undoubtedly prevented by the dominance of the Soviet establishment and the Communist Party of India in any work on the Soviet Union – and the swing towards Indo-Soviet relations as the main subject for research against the background of a paucity of research material in India for basic work on the Russian Empire and the USSR. The Indian state added to these impediments

through the caution it exercised in developing independent lines of research through the University exchange program – focusing primarily on science exchange.

Conclusion

The personal experience of the Indian historians mentioned above, as well as their output and the output of several others, may be used to confirm some of the case that Banerji makes about the restrictive nature of historical enterprise in the USSR. But it is clear that this is far from the whole of their story. The experience of individuals indicates the limits of Banerji's case, showing the considerable amount that could be done despite the restrictions. The limited consequences of what transpired are an Indian story – not a Russian story.

How far the experience of other schools of scholarship inside and outside the USSR would confirm the Indian experience is the subject of other papers in this volume. And it is to be hoped that given the range of experiences that are present in this seminar that the contributions will provide the foundations for substantial reflection.

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The History of the Voivode Rule in Siberia from Peter I to Ekaterina II in the light of Soviet and Russian historiography

Denis A. Ananyev

The history of the local administration of Siberia in the 18th century begins with the epoch of 'modernization' and 'Europeanization' of Russia – something that had long remained outside the attention of indigenous historians. Specialized research on this was lacking at the beginning of the 20th century and this was mainly due to the absence of theoretical concepts about the evolution of the administrative systems of Siberia as well as that of the narrowness of the resource base. In the classical researches of M. Bogoslovsky and U. Gothe, the history of state administration of Russia in the 18th century was studied but the regional aspect was not examined. The researchers collected data about the works of administrative organs of different parts of the empire, including Siberia, only in those cases, where these examples described situations, typical for the entire system of the local administration. At the same time U. Gothe acknowledged that the 'specificities of the systems of each of ...the oblasts (including Siberia – D.A.) deserve to be studied separately.'¹

In modern indigenous historiography the task of writing such surveys for a long time remained unresolved, conditioned by the specificities of the development of the historical sciences in the Soviet period. First, the researchers had to review the general concept of the history of Russian statehood during autocratic rule. Working out new approaches was a complicated process because of the necessity of combining it not only with Marxist theory but also with new ideological trends that emerged from the political leadership of both periods. During 1920-1940, the study of the history of the governance of Siberia was linked to either the analysis of the Tsarist colonial policies and the publication of archival material, which illustrated the particular issue or was linked to the evidence about progressive significance of Russian colonization in far-off regions².

Thus, the task before historians is the study of internal and external aspects of the evolution of the bureaucratic administration during the 18th century. As a whole these issues may be addressed as researchers study the history of the local administration and its most stable elements that have survived 'transitional' periods of state development. One such stable element in the history of the Russian statehood is the local voivode administration which appeared in the second half of the 16th century and which existed till the end of the 18th century i.e. during the entire period of the establishment of Russian absolutism.

The voivode appointed by the central bureaucratic departments, administered Russian cities and uyezds along with local aristocratic-electoral organs of self-rule. In the first quarter of the 18th century the voivode institutions underwent many administrative reforms and remained the main element of the uezd administration till the realization of gubernatorial reforms of 1775.

By bringing a complicated system of local administration to the new territories the authorities wanted to keep the territories under their control. The voivode administration initially served as an instrument of ensuring the political interests of the centre on the peripheries and also as a means of safeguarding the military-political interests of the Russian state in the course of its territorial expansion.

An evidence of the effectiveness of the voivode authorities is their organizing role in the successful assimilation of Siberia which began towards the end of the 16th century. The history of the voivode administration of Siberia became the subject of research that addressed a wide range of academic issues.

The first detailed analysis of the Siberian administration of the 18th century (e.g. the system of local administration of Eastern Siberia) was made by V.N. Sherstoboev, in his research about the history of the Ilimsky region³. According to him, the 18th century was the 'century of enlightenment of the bureaucracy', with which was associated the «centralized absolutist leadership of the enslaved country through officers and the absence of self-rule»⁴.

The main feature of the administration of Siberia during this period, according to Sherstoboev, was the 'linear subjugation and universalism of functions' in a region that had an immense territory and a sparse population⁵. However, from the time the centralized mechanism of administration became less flexible, the control over the quality of implementation of government decisions became complicated and ceased to be effective.

Sherstoboev reviewed the complex character of local administration. He analyzed the main stages of the reorganization of the administrative-territorial division of Eastern Siberia, described the principles of internal organization of the Ilmsky voivode chancellery, its structure and main activities, the principles and condition of chancellery production, made a general evaluation of the individual composition of the leadership of the voivode chancellery (comprising of the voivode, governors, secretaries and those 'with registration') as well as the lower rungs of the workers – chancellors, sub-chancellors, copyists and 'clerks'.

Thus V. Sherstoboev took as the base the principle according to which major attention was paid to the study of the historical sources (in this case, the production material), although the inferences made coincided with the general concept of state administration in the 18th century that was accepted in Soviet historiography. The concrete results of the research, which were made by Sherstoboev, could not always be used to characterize the voivode administration of entire Siberia in the 18th century. However, the very approach of the historian towards the study of the activities of the local Siberian administration is represented as beneficial.

L.C. Rafienko, the author of a series of articles on the history of the administration of Siberia in 1720-1780 also followed this particular approach.⁶ On one hand, the researcher contextualized government policies in relation to the far-off regions with the general course of state development in the 18th century. On the other hand, the evolution of the administrative system of Siberia was evaluated on the basis of the study of the status and competency of the local departments, the individual composition of the local organs, their practical activities, and also the correlation of this activity to the demands of the legislature.

Voivode and provincial chancellery, together with the gubernia chancellery were the most important links of the local administration in the period under the scope of the present study, and without any doubt, deserved greater attention. Moreover, the analysis of the voivode administration of Siberia in the 18th century was closely linked with the characteristic of the evolution of Russian absolutism, its layered politics, and also demanded the study of the individual composition of the gentry and bureaucracy and ordered workers, who worked in the organs of the voivode administration and the evaluation of their social impressions and the context of the administrative practices.

Many of these questions became the subject of discussions about the essence and specifics of Russian absolutism, which were re-addressed by Soviet historiography during 1960-70. The main direction of the discussions was determined by the attempts of historians to reject simplistic understanding of history and attempts to bring out 'political' superstructure directly from the development of the basic phenomenon, to find a direct connection between the form of power and economic processes'.

The subject of specialized academic research was the process of bureaucratization of the administration in the 17th-18th centuries, and first of all, its 'social' aspect – the growth and development of the group of professional officers, who implemented functions of state administration for a monetary remuneration. S. Trotsky wrote about the administration in the middle of the 18th century and argued that the study of the history of the administration of Siberia in the 17th-18th centuries has been fruitful as it dealt with the 'individual composition of officers who influenced the activities of the institutions and while following governmental policies, also attracted the attention of the researcher'.⁷

According to him, the cadre politics of the government vis-à-vis the Siberian administration coincided with general Russian politics. The attempts of the gentry-bureaucracy, who comprised of the voivode in Siberia, were conditioned by their aristocratic status. According to the historian, voivode posts, like before, was often considered a reward for difficult military service... and though the voivodes till 1764 did not receive state salaries, and were fed 'from work', the gentry, especially the middle and petty gentry, tried to receive this service. They were attracted by the prospect of powers, factual lack of any control and the possibility of receiving huge dividends through illegal contributions from the population.

The study of the individual composition of gentry-bureaucrats who served in Siberia in the 18th century was undertaken by the Siberian historian G.F. Bykonya and M.O. Akishin.⁸ Referring to this topic, G. F. Bykonya indicated that marginal attention was given to 'questions of formation, functioning, and class-social conditions of the military-bureaucratic gentry of the country and especially of Siberia in the later feudal period'.⁹ In her opinion, the feudal-serf system in Russia with its rigid class structure retarded the process of delineating in that society the working class of the ordered and official bureaucracy, which was substituted in the civil and military departments by the representatives of the ruling class.

Correspondingly, the absolutist state within a long span of time was forced to use the gentry as the main weapons of implementing reorganization, while maintaining the obligations of the gentry service.¹⁰

Seeing its main support in the gentry, which could help 'in full measure to retain the unshakeable aristocratic structure', the autocrats began to orient their aristocratic and administrative policies in support of the class purity of the gentry bureaucracy. The result of this policy was the isolation of the numerous 'estateless' (those who did not possess any estate) officers-individual gentry and uber-i.e. the officer with service origins, who formed a major part of the Siberian bureaucracy. G. Bykonya does not include this social group in the bureaucratic and military divisions of the 'feudal-corporate type', but defines as 'the most privileged service layer, well inclined to the dominating class'.

However, as the historian acknowledges, the 'estateless' private gentry remained the 'element of late-feudal serfdom of the Russian society', the carriers of 'corporate-class interests of the ruling class of the country', which 'themselves from all forces tried by rank to enter the club of the corporate feudalists with the rights of the hereditary gentry'. The conflict between the factual position of this class of officers and their class endeavors could not manifest itself in their official activities, leading to misuse and violations of bureaucratic administrative activities.

M. Akishin in his new monograph made a general research of the history of administration of Siberia of the 18th century and debated the study of the corporate structure of the Siberian officialdom through the analysis of its social origins.¹¹ On the basis of the study of the vast archival material M. Akishin found data almost about 1500 officers of various levels, serving in Siberia in the 18th century. The main inference of the historian is that towards the end of the century the Siberian officialdom formed an 'all-class' social group, isolated from participation in the production relations and fully dependent on the receipt of salaries.

In their activities they lived with the ideas of serving the monarchy and the 'general welfare' (public interest) in accordance with the norms of material and procedural law and rigid organizational discipline. At the same time, Akishin was not inclined to speak about the misuse by gentry-officials keeping in mind their aristocratic psychology. Consequently, it was taboo to speak about the

contradictions between the bureaucratic 'form' of state apparatus and its narrow class 'content'.

The main characteristics of the bureaucracy, described by Akishin, manifested itself in the activities of the voivode, although the author speaks negatively about the voivode administration in the 18th century. Akishin considers the joint administrative and legal powers in the hands of the voivodes towards the end of the 1720s upto the beginning of the 1780s as the direct result of the 'counter-reforms' of the initial years after the death of Peter I. Along with this has been taken into consideration 'the attempts of the ideologues of the counter-reforms that will engender the Moscow 'antiquity' which did not lead to the rejection of the principles of the bureaucratic organization of the administration'.

M. Akishin completely studied the composition of the Siberian voivodes and administrators, collected data about the dynasties, whose representatives served in the provincial and voivode chancelleries. However, the character of the voivode institutions did not receive special attention.

Analyzing the summary of the administrative reforms and the evolution of the structure of the administration of Siberia in the 18th century, M. Akishin concluded that the basis of this evolution comprised the process of bureaucratization, which manifested in the rationalization of the system of state institutions, the establishment of the legislature about state service and the formation of new corporate-style state service.¹² This confirms the conclusions of the historian about the bureaucratic character of the administration of Siberia and its new 'corporate' self-realization of Siberian officials and its relevance especially for the study of the contemporary activities of local institutions. Akishin shows that this activity was primarily noticeable in the legal-investigative department, which concerned the representatives of the Siberian administration. Judging these sources, the work of the local institutions seemed to be far beyond the bureaucratic ideals. The historian himself is forced to acknowledge that the 'change of values for some generations engendered the world view of the ruling class of the Russian empire, the rejection of old values and the unpreparedness of accepting new ones which strengthened the spirit of greed and profit'.¹³ The elimination of the cleavage between the primary and the new values in the consciousness of the officials occurred fully towards the end of the century.

On the whole, it can be said that throughout the 20th century indigenous historians studied only individual aspects of the history of the Siberian administration of the 18th century. Various data about the activities of the Siberian administrators can be gleaned from the works of S. Bakhrushina, N. Pokrovsky, N. Emelyanov, L. Goldenberg, N. Minenko, M. Gromyko, A. Ivonin, D. Ananyev and others.¹⁴ However, there needs to be an analysis about the history of the local administration of Siberia in the 'transitional period', a period that was marked by uninterrupted reforms.

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The National Regimes of Russia in search of their 'indigenous' history

Marina N. Baldano

In the 1980-1990s, the search for historical truth became a national phenomenon which engulfed almost all sections of society, independent of their social or ethnic identities. In many ways this was explained by the transformation of social consciousness and deep politicization of the masses, because of the historical events of that period and the disintegration of the Soviet system. Moreover, both Russian and the regional social consciousness underwent a crisis of national identity. One of the ways to overcome this was to refer back to the past, to historical roots.

The process of historical knowledge in the Soviet years consisted of firstly, official and ideological levels which had wide dissemination and action; and secondly, representation of a choice of oral historical schemes, gossips some of which was reflected in the mass consciousness and in the ethnic memory of the people. Simultaneously, a stereotype was formed that official history – is just the distorted shadow of the history of truth. Gorbachev's liberalism established the fact that many age-old schemes and concepts which had formed the official paradigm of Russian and regional history, began to be doubted.

The actualization of the past became a medium for the self-identification of society, and as a search for answers to the question 'Who are we?' and 'Where are we coming from?' Arguments concerning the origins of Russian and other ethnicities as well as the Russian state had been articulated earlier by historians, but as a matter of fact they did not go beyond the limits of professional space. There was an attempt to raise the question, in popular publications, about the postulates of the earlier official history of Russia and the patterns of the past in mass consciousness began to erode, thereby diverting its orientations and categories.

The main group of publications, attributed to the national Russian history, appeared on the pages of the national and patriotic editions.

The phenomenon of "*folk-history*" appeared at this time, and it actively impacted on the formation of mass historical consciousness. In the editions that were published in the category "*folk-history*", there was greater dissemination of the revisionist historical literature. Professional historiography tried to distance itself from both 'revisionists' and from "*folk-history*".

Towards the middle of the 1990s the euphoria of historical sensation that occurred mainly along the principles of exposing the 'accursed' past, began to wane. This was linked to some particular tendencies in the development of indigenous historical literature. People began to get tired of negative information, and the interest in a positive past was ignited by the disillusionment with the present. Some political parties tried to play on the mass historical stereotypes, as they, by the way, still try to do.

The historiographical trends of the end of the last century were marked by the process of institutionalization and by the spurt of nationalist historiographies. It was distinguished by stronger ethnocentrism – of the research approach for which the sympathetic attitude of one ethnic group till the emergence of the ethno-national factor as a major criterion in historical knowledge became a characteristic. The basis of historical construction was formed by the questions regarding the development of ethno-national statehood, ethno-national territory and boundaries, ethno-national culture and ethno-national language.

The research of the Soviet period in the development of Buryat historiography demonstrated many specificities which were characteristic of the evolution of humanitarian sciences in the USSR. It is understood that regional historiography was not free from ideological confusion that engulfed the domain of Soviet historical sciences. The directive necessity to follow Marxist methodology exclusively, the known political cliché, within whose framework the tracking of this or that event or problem of the historical past was allowed, the lack of freedom in choosing the subjects for research, and simultaneously, the existence of politically situated tendencies – all this was present in the Buryat Soviet historiography.

In the period of disintegration of communist ideology, Buryat historical sciences were restructured. Some Buryat historians directly participated in ideological battles of that time. Their political position became the reflection of civil and patriotic moods, and they subjugated their professional knowledge to the objectives of the national

movement, in part, to the foundation of their programme's underpinning, by cooperating closely with the Congress of the Buryat people, the All Buryat Association of Cultural Development.¹

The new priorities of the Buryat historiography was reflected in the general interests, which were actualized by the prevailing political situation. This conditioned the contemporary investigative boom. With the decrease of censures and limitation, a great social interest and a clearly articulated social order stimulated research and investigative work. Its result was the appearance of several articles, a series of monographs by a broad spectrum of Buryat historians. At the same time the characteristic feature of this period of historiographical development was its publicity. Scientific ideas, concepts, and perspectives were laid out not on the pages of academic publications but in the newspapers and other periodical publications.

The greatest interest was attracted by the problem of the unity of regions to Russia, the ethno-genesis of the Buryats, the Buryat national movement from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th centuries, the activities of individual and bright representatives of the national intelligentsia at the beginning of the 20th century, the 'division' of the Buryat-Mongol ASSR in 1937, the national cultural renaissance of the nations of the region. A kind of emotional hangover prevailed in the early phase. For instance, if during the Soviet time the annexation of Buryatia to Russia was considered to be 'voluntary', and Russian subjecthood was considered as the only possibility of maintaining the Buryat ethnos, then a modern evaluation of this process was far from being the only one, and is expressed in greater and stricter categories, such as 'union', 'colonization', etc.²

The investigation of the psychology of the Buryat nation showed, that in the process of the disintegration of earlier ideologies, myths, symbols, ideals and values, it became, on one hand, filling in a historical, culturally deep idea, going on forever, and on the other – the search for new spiritual orientations.³

The history of the 20th century was subjected to the greatest scrutiny. But first of all it must be said that there exists a certain differentiation in the acceptance of the events of the Soviet period for the residents of the country on the whole and in the Republic of Buryatia in particular. The Russian mass consciousness, while positively accepting the cultural and social values of society which existed till 1917, does not quite approve about what occurred in the Soviet period. In Buryatia everything turned out to be different. The

Russian section of the population began to identify itself with the all-Russian history, and the Soviet period were not merely years of mass repression and domination engineered by the administrative-command system, but it was also a time which gave a feeling of a certain national comfort, when the representatives of various ethnicities considered themselves on the whole to be 'Soviet'. The Buryats also had a different approach about this period. For them, this period, although coterminous with great sacrifices, was also simultaneously linked to the change of the entire cultural and economic structure, and with the obtainment, though in much only decorative terms, of their own statehood.

The new period of history of Buryats was the most mythologised in Soviet historiography- not only did they lack coverage of individual events and personalities, but also the entire history represented an idealized phenomenon. There were other mythologies that were embedded in the social consciousness. The first was attached to the perception that Buryatia 'suffered most in the years of the Soviet totalitarianism', and second – with the dissemination of opinion that the Kremlin policy was specially directed towards the mutilation of the entire territorial-state entity of the republic and the devastation of all-round future development. These questions need objective research, from the point of view of new achievements of historical science, by involving supplementary documental material.

The bewilderment due to the economic transformation of Buryatia in the Soviet period, apparently, was linked to the fact that the country truly achieved great industrial success in the post-Soviet period and was affected by an unprecedented industrial crisis and social impoverishment.

During the Soviet period a grandiose and effective modernization of industry and scientific-industrial infrastructure occurred. At the same time the principle difference between modernization in Soviet Union and in other countries⁴ is underestimated. Soviet modernization was built not on the economic interest of the people, but on rigid coercion; it operated not only on the basis of strong political institutions but also due to maximum centralization of the economic sphere. Its result was the extreme irreversibility of the economic system with stable reverse links. As a result, this condition overthrew the totalitarian regime.

Even if we have to talk about the new personification of the historical past, then even here significant changes occurred. A new

evaluation by B. Baradin, Ts. Zhamtsarano, E. D. Rinchino, M. Bogdanov, B. Vampilon, A. Dorzhiev resulted in the rehabilitation of names like D. Sampilon, Ts.E. Tsydypov and others. The names of Buryats, Russian merchant-patrons, religious activists and the representatives of the repressive, national intelligentsia were mentioned in historical texts.

What is characteristic is that, unlike Russian historiography, during this time the relation between the state and party activists of the Soviet period hardly changed.

The main element of historical restructuring was (as is observed in other national regions) the ideology of the nation-state⁵ It has often been seen as the only place in the world, where ethnos has an inherent right to support and develop its language and culture. In individual works it has been clearly observed that there is an attempt to absolve one's own nation from the status of historical and cultural periphery, from the known role and to find arguments favoring the fact that its achievement is comparable with the generally accepted prestigious types of world civilizations.⁶

The changes in historical sciences found their reflection in the policies of the state during the determination of the programmes of historical structuring in schools and in institutes of higher learning and in the creation of corresponding literature. Towards the middle of the 1990s, a great quantity of textbooks appeared which represented various methodological approaches and rich interpretations. In teaching indigenous history systematic and civilizational approaches gained popularity, when Russian history, on one hand, was presented in a global context⁷ and Russia, on the other hand, was presented as a special civilization.⁸ At the same time, problems of Russian life and Russian civilization were a general cultural phenomenon.

From the entire genre of textbook literature it was difficult to delineate the more objective part dedicated to indigenous history. Moreover, for reasons understandable, there was no emphasis on the history and culture of our region, and their contribution to Russian civilization. The works of various specialists – ethnographers, archaeologists, historians – came to be used as the text book literature on the history of Buryatia. A little later, special written books on the history of the region⁹ appeared.

The activation of interest regarding the history of the republic was facilitated by conducting various events on a grand scale: international conferences, seminars and meetings, national

congresses, celebration of the jubilee of the national epic 'Geser', the 300th anniversary of the mission of the Khory-Buryat to the court of Tsar Peter I, 'Altargan' and others. In 2001 the 'Historical Cultural Atlas of Buryatia' was published, a year earlier – the directory on the history, culture and economy of the 'Republic of Buryatia', current preparations are on for the multi-volume 'History of Buryatia'. In principle this process is typical of the publication of regional (gubernsky) encyclopedias and directories.

The actualization of the past has engendered new national histories (Tatar, Bashkir, etc.). There have been movements in the acceptance of history of the country and its heroes – the stakes have increased on strong personalities, imperial values and authoritarian styles of governance. In the second half of the 1990s the Russian authorities seriously spoke about the demands of society and the State in some unified national idea, the 'Russian idea', called on to fill the vacuum in ideas, which appeared after the disintegration of Communist ideology as state ideology. However, till date this idea has not been formulated fully, although it is quite obvious, that it should be an idea of the state, without any ethnic leanings.

Since the representatives of various political groups held onto contradictory perspectives on the events of Russian history, there appeared 'Russian histories' in the period under review none of which was officially acknowledged. One had led, under conditions of economic instability, to the phenomenon of nationalism, which speculated on patriotic traditions, and on the other – this was a guarantee that the historical consciousness will not be pushed to the periphery of social life, but will continue to play an important role in the spiritual and socio-political evolution of society.

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The Provincial Soviet Historian of the 'stagnant years': professional possibilities and limitations

V.I. Dyatlov

The task before our Round Table is to speak about one of the versions of Russian/Soviet history. Books on this genre are numerous, and there will be more to come in the future. The evaluation of such a global phenomenon like 'socialism in Russia', which did much to change the global trajectory of historical development, is extremely important. Equally significant is an understanding of various perspectives, some stereotypical, which combined experiences of those who have written about this.

For history – is what and how a historian writes. In many ways, it is the realization of his own experience, his own destiny. It is possible, therefore, that for Indians the experience of a Russian historian, who personally and professionally grew up during the late Soviet period, 'the period of stagnation' will be interesting. Further, the person is one who was born, grew up, received his education and worked all his life in the provinces, in Siberia. It is personally interesting for me to review this experience not only from the standpoint of age but also from experience of another era, and in many ways, even from a different world.

The framework of a Round Table does not allow the realization of this endeavor in a big context. Hence, I propose a few topics.

I consider monopoly to be the main professional problem of that era- the monopoly of a single concept, a single impression of history, a single methodology. The question is not whether this monopoly was bad or good. Consolidated by the repressive strength of a state based on a particular vision and set of ideas, it became the ideology, which put a question mark over the possibility of professional and scientific activity. The monopoly of the state was consolidated by its repressive might – and by the regular demonstration of its readiness to use this might. From time to time 'stagnation' from this point of

view was relatively benign in nature – to be jailed and the historian had to strive much. However, receiving a ‘ban on the profession’ could easily be achieved.

This was not all. The state was the only employer. And it valued work first of all according to particular political criteria. It had monopoly over all resources, necessary for research and it possessed all scientific infrastructure. The state was not simply the owner of archives, libraries, scientific journals (in general of all information media) but also controlled all access to it and to its usage. This was a daily, routine and systematic procedure. In the libraries there were so-called ‘special reserves’, separate book holders. Books from these ‘special reserves’ could be used only by selected persons and by those who had special permits. The archival material was given out in strict coordination with the subject of the stated research work. Excerpts from it could be made only in special copy-books with numbered pages, which after completion of the work, was censored by the workers in the archive. All information, which was banned for dissemination, was removed from it. And finally, the entire system of censures, which included not only specialized state institutions, but also those like scientific and educational institutions that intruded in daily lives of the people. This formed a strong complex of self-censorship.

The state in various ways curtailed international contacts of Soviet historians, and effectively prevented their integration in the professional bodies of the world. This formed a hermetic insulation of the professional world. This was facilitated by the specifics of the scientific language, conceptual and terminological apparatus, language problems etc. With the exception of the specialists in Russia, the humanitarian sciences were not read in the Russian language abroad. And Soviet works were translated into European languages very rarely. Thus, a closed world existed, with its own language, its own hierarchy, status levels, criteria, and so on. It co-related with the general world scientific community in a single order: through readings by Soviet scientists (of course not all, not even the majority) of works of foreign colleagues.

The Soviet humanitarian sciences were vertically organised – the main scientific institutes, the scientific schools, the major part of the infrastructure and resources were concentrated in Moscow. As exceptions and as preserved traditions they existed in Leningrad. There a special professional ambience existed. Outside this system a

person could remain only as an outsider. This created special problems for students from the provinces.

The listing of these problems created a totally bleak picture, yet another illustration for the discourse on totalitarianism. This picture forces us to ask the question – could one become an academic-historian under such circumstances and continue to exist in such a capacity?

The personal experiences, several years of observation of one's professional community, and most importantly, post-Soviet developments indicate that this was possible. And in conditions of ideological control and restrictions on research, the scientific researchers in the humanitarian sphere continued to work by reproducing the work of a few professional scientists.

This situation speaks not only of the possibilities about totalitarianism but also about its limitations. The Soviet experience demonstrates the impossibility of total control and total power of the state over society. The state wanted this to be so – but this was clearly too big a task for it.

The proclivity towards scientific creation turned out to be an undying one. Professionalism and professional ethics were handed over from hand to hand. The possibility of correlating the tradition and reproduction of the scientific discourse by reading the works of pre-revolutionary scientists, as well as that of Soviet scientists, who had received professional training before the revolution existed. In 1970-80s, Moscow libraries received almost all foreign scientific periodicals and all significant works of their foreign colleagues. This allowed the support (though with considerable hardship) of contacts (though only one-sided) with the global scientific community. Our colleagues abroad did not read our works but we read theirs.

All this led to the formation of various strategies and practices for those who did not want to become propagandists and who were interested in scientific knowledge (and there was a great attraction towards this).

There were 'niches', specializations and objects of study where state control was minimum. For natural sciences – everything was connected to the protection and satisfaction of demands of those in power. Such an approach was true in the humanitarian sciences too. After the disintegration of the Eastern policies abroad in the 1950s-60's, the state created infrastructure for Oriental studies (academic and research institutes, trips, buying literature for the libraries).

Simultaneously, the ideological press also curtailed its actions. Among sections of the bureaucracy there was an understanding that without freedom of survey, scientific research was impossible. Thus, Orientalism of the Soviet times was one of the fastest developing humanitarian disciplines. The state ideological control was reduced in those cases, which the authorities considered to be academically abstract or far removed from real life – the knowledge of language, linguistics, and literature specialist. Those who wanted to ensure for oneself academic freedom, though heavily curtailed, tried to be far removed from the history of Russia /USSR, especially in the 20th century.

An effective strategy was the strategy of individual consciousness and strategy that were distinct from the general conceptualizations, evaluations and general analysis. Here the poorest could push their narratives to their limits.

For those who wanted to study theories and methodologies, a common method was the 'exit to Marx'. The attempt was to turn his works from 'ideological icons' to research instruments and this method functioned till the end of the 20th century.

During any election it was mandatory to follow certain rules. During the 'period of stagnation' ideological control was exerted more on the form and not on the content. Hence, practical work developed together with censorship. Their essence was reflected in the phrase that appeared then: «if it is forbidden to jump over the pillar, it can be bypassed'. The Aesopian language was formed, i.e. the language of maintaining silence and of euphemisms. Sometimes this became quite attractive for some. One had to clearly know the limits of risk, of what was permitted, of what was categorically forbidden, of what was not allowed, but if there was great will, then what was allowed. Moreover, the restrictions were quite variable.

And this was an everyday affair. A disturbing one, an interrupting one but acknowledged as a norm. Today, from the sidelines it seems to be unreal and savage.

Writing histories in Central Asia: contemporary dilemmas

Mirzoid Rakhimov

In March 2009 the Moscow based internet site <http://www.ferghana.ru> published an interview with the famous Soviet archeologist Boris Litvinskiy, who during many decades had extensive academic research in Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan, where he had closely worked with the Bobodjon Gafurov¹, the then first secretary of the Tajik Communist party. In the interview Litvinskiy mentioned his considerable contribution on Gafurov's famous book "Tadjiki: drevneyshaya, drevnaya i srednevekovaya istoriya" in its fourth edition, which was much enlarged compare with previous editions. In the interview Litvinskiy also talks about his work in the Soviet period on creation of textbooks on the history of Tajikistan for high schools and university system. At the same time Litvinskiy thanks Gafurov for his support in getting apartment, social and academic status in Tajikistan, later registration and apartment in Moscow.

It is well known that Bobojon Gafurov is the father of historians in Tajikistan and the interview naturally raised a series of critical responses from Tajik scholars. But the main question is why Litvinskiy openly raised all this issues only now? What are the peculiarities in the Soviet history writing? To understand these factors we need to examine the Soviet system in education, culture, and humanities and in history writing and teaching in particular.

From the time of establishing of Soviet rule considerable attention was dedicated to education in entire country, including in Central Asian republics. As a result the educational policy helped in solving the problem of illiteracy in the region and raised the level of literacy among Central Asian populations. During the Soviet past thousands of high schools and dozens of universities were formed in Central Asia. For instance, in Uzbekistan the number of higher schools reached 9,188 and the number of institutes and universities reached 42 by 1985. As a result, the general educational level of the

population rose steadily and the ranks of qualified specialists actively expanded. But despite these positive tendencies the education system was fragmentary and tended mostly to be in terms of quantity rather than quality. In the 1980th there were worsening trends in Soviet Union due to the negative the impact of adverse developments across the USSR, and the consequences of the Soviet Government's regional policies including Central Asia.²

At the same time the Soviet regime implemented a struggle against popular and religious customs and the traditions of the family and daily life in Central Asia. The new Soviet rites and rituals were artificially implanted in their place. Great harm was done to cultural development by the policy of accelerated 'internationalization', which was based on communist ideas about the priority of class interests over national interests and the inevitability of the merging of nations. I.e., the formation of a culture, which was 'socialist in content, internationalist in spirit' and national in form. This approach led to the pernicious process of changing Central Asian culture to match the demands of 'class purity' and 'proletarian internationalism'. The result was the increasing alienation of the people from the roots of their centuries-long cultural heritage and destruction of their historical memory.

Soviets language policy was another tool for forming the common Soviet system. In 1938 leaders of USSR adopted a resolution on the obligatory study of Russian in national schools, which entailed a reduction in the number of hours allocated for study of the mother tongue. In 1940 the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced by decree. These measures for raising Russian to the level of the state language, further limited opportunities for developing regional languages.³. Development of Russian was of course a very positive tendency, but its negative side was restrictive approaches to national languages. It should note that at the beginning of the 20-century intellectuals in Central Asia, including Bekhbudi proposed the use of Arabic, Russian, Persian and Turki.⁴ But, the Soviets had theirs own policy toward languages.

In the Gorbachev period, Central Asia saw the birth of national movements, which expressed demands for national-democratic reforms and real sovereignty. Different political and social movements appeared which focused on the restoration of national culture and statehood. Specific expression of this process was found in the elevation of the Central Asian languages to the status of state

language in 1989-90⁵ and the drafting of measures aimed at resolving the most important national economic tasks, like the cotton monoculture in agriculture, and revealing national traditions and customs. It was interesting to discover during my visit in 2004 to Estonia that three Baltic States are still wildly using Russian in communication between themselves. In the Post-Soviet Central Asia Russian is still wildly used.

Religion in the USSR was a very important aspect for communist ideological policy. During the Soviet antireligious campaign in the 1930s Islam and Christianity was suppressed. Traditional Islamic education was almost destroyed and the traditional transmission of basic Islamic knowledge was interrupted. Religious study was prohibited, as was the study of the writings of historical state leaders. Only during the Second World War did the situation change a little, when the Soviet government created four regional Muslim Spiritual Directorates, with the largest one located in Tashkent.⁶ The Soviet regime was disconnected from traditional Islamic education in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. In the 1980's it was possible to get basic Islamic education from the local Mullah.

As a result of Soviet religious policy, new generations of Central Asian people have no knowledge of Islam, with the exception of some specialists. As a result, a great interest in Islam has been aroused in the former Soviet republics, including those in Central Asian, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Academy of Sciences and several research institutes, including History were opened in Central Asian republics and the process of preparation and publishing national histories of Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Tajik republics started. In 1945-1946 was already published the History of Uzbek SSR in two volumes was published in order to begin the process of division of Central Asia common heritage on the national histories. In the Soviet time there were changes of terminology and definition of the Central Asia and the region stated call *Srednyaya Aziya* (Middle Asia), which was for political reasons to refer the four southern republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan was regarded as a separate entity and hence referred to separately *Srednyay Aziya i Kazakhstan* (Middle Asia and Kazakhstan).⁷

From the end 50th it was decided to teach national histories in the high school system. But, majority history textbook and classes was on the history of Russian and Soviet Union. For instance in middle

of 1980th when I studied at the 8^{th grade} textbook on history began with the ancient Slavic tribes and Kievian Rus' (VII-IX century) and followed the rulers of Russia into the XVIII century. While the countries of Central Asia and Caucasus were viewed as marginal, and only 4 hours of the school year were devoted to the overview of the events in those regions. It was wildly gross falsifications of the Soviet era historical records, filled with misinterpretations and propaganda, and demand serious revision. Students knew Russian historical figures -Aleksandr Nevskiy, Piter I, better than Central Asian ones like Ismail Somony, Bobur, Amir Temur and Temurids. The writings of K. Marx, V. Lenin and other communist leaders were very well known but there was no learning about - like Imom-Buhoriy, Bahuddin Nakshbandi, Djadidz.

History was highly politicized in Soviet period and historical events were often used for ideological and political purposes. In 1960th it Soviet historiography was officially prohibited to use the term "Russia conquered Central Asia" but instead used "Central Asia was annexed by the Russians".

In 2008 working in committee on the Reconstruction of Museum of the Memory of Repressions in Tashkent, I had to see different historical materials, including family archives on the repressions and suppression during Soviet period. Interesting case was when in 1969 director of the publisher house, famous writer Pirimkul Kadirov edited and published some text of Djajid literature in the book "Tirik Satirlar" (Alive sentences), but after discussing it at the Central Communistic Party the book prohibited and whole published copies was destroyed and only few copies which was taken in the publish house left in the hand of the scholar. Since the declaration of independence, the history of Central Asia has become a topic for an aggressive study. Special courses within a variety of educational establishments of the republics have been designed and promoted. But, there still some problem as reported in a 2000 sociological survey conducted by our group at the universities of the city of Tashkent, the majority of students were not able to answer the question "What present day historians do you know?"

Similar processes of history revision and rewriting were taking place in all republics of Central Asia. At the same time, a new problem of incongruity in dating some historical events surfaced as a significant scholarly obstacle, once the new textbooks were published. But processes of history revision and rewriting were

colored by the nationally driven search for identity in the new context of the world community. At the same time, new, often highly politicized, interpretations of the historical past had a negative impact on the credibility of the discipline. Revival of national cultures and traditions of Central Asian peoples were an important factor in ensuring political and social stability. It could be added that history writing and interpretation of historical events in past and modern is product also of the current interstate relations which is the reason why the Litwinskiy interview was polished during cooling relation between Russia and Tajikistan.

Today, there still seems to be no common methodology in the study of Central Asia as a whole, which could be adopted by the regional scholars; the same can be said about the scholars within the country. In my opinion, it is absolutely necessary for the research community to jointly develop a common ground, so that studies of the history and culture of the peoples representing the region could complement each other's findings and mutually enrich our approaches. For archiving it I think it is important to have regular seminars in the Central Asian universities on history in general and Central Asia one. It couple very useful to do it jointly with international universities located in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Also it is necessary to enlarge comparative regional histories, for instance Indian and Central Asia region. There are many similarities and differences in the history writing and methodologies and having joint seminar will very useful for academic community for mutual enrichment. An excellent stimulus for such an international effort is the UNESCO patronage through the program "History of Civilizations of Central Asia", in which experts from many countries are united in a multilateral program⁸.

Indo-Uzbek and Indo-Central Asia seminars will be useful for both sides. The Maulana Abdul Kalam Institute for Asian studies in 2005 published the book of Bobodjon Gafurov by using title "History of Central Asia". I think this right approach for founding common ground of national, regional and international history writing of the Central Asia history. Indeed each generation is writing its own history, but for the contemporary historians probably is time to learn from the past, learn from others, understand and working together with colleagues from different countries to find common approaches and mutual enrichment.

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Interpretation of National Histories and Establishment of National States in Central Asia

*Prof. Muzaffar Olimov
Tajik National University
Center for study Tajiks of the world (Tajikistan)*

The recognition of history or the problem of interpretation of history is one of the most important issues of the humanities subject in the modern world. It is of particular importance for the post-Soviet states including the countries of Central Asia. The formation of nation states after disintegration of the USSR has been accompanied by a drastic revision of history, which is characterized by discarding communist interpretation of history and replacement of the great-power and imperial model by the model of "national" history.

The formation of national histories is related to revision of history, division of the common legacy and advent of numerous conflicting interpretations of personalities, events and phenomena. As a result, historians in Uzbekistan suggest that ancient Turks, the ancestors of the Uzbeks, were the most ancient ethnos of Central Asia, and that it was them whom Greeks called Scythians¹, and that Tajiks appeared in Maverannahr much later than Uzbeks. Tajik historians, in turn argue that Farsi speaking Tajiks are the most ancient ethnos in the region, since Tajiks are direct successors of Aryans². Remarkable changes are taking place regarding historic personalities, cities and territories. In Uzbekistan, Tamerlane is considered to be a cultural hero and the founder of Uzbek nationhood, whereas in Tajikistan, Iran, India, Georgia and Armenia, he is known as a conqueror and tyrant who destroyed cultural values and committed genocides. Both in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, maps in school and university textbooks show Bukhara and Samarkand as capitals of their own ancient and medieval states. In Chinese school textbooks the map of modern China includes territories of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, which makes citizens of those states wonder. Tajik historians claim,

in their turn, that the Tajik state of Kirpand used to exist on the territory of western China.

In general we need to note that modern history is distinguishable by its strong emphasis on ethnocentrism – an approach in research that is characterized by sympathetic treatment of one's own ethnic group and going as far as setting forth the ethno-nationalist factor as the main criterion for historical cognizance³.

Ethno-centrism as a phenomenon of historical cognizance appeared for the first time in the form of Eurocentrism. It provided the basis for building a nation in the period of transition of European communities from traditionalism towards industrialization. Ethnocentrism is the core of the entire national and state historiography. It clearly manifests itself in school and university textbooks, encyclopedic and reference literature.⁴ Today, similar to the past, national historians in nation-states under formation primarily address the goals of ideological and political justification for nation building processes.⁵

Speaking about the interpretation of national histories and conflicts in Central Asian countries, one needs to touch briefly upon the issue of national historiographies.

At present, there are different views as to whether national schools of historiography existed in the former USSR or not. Some scholars (A.Kappeler) maintain that national historiographic schools were preserved and developed in individual Soviet republics. After the Stalinist era they underwent a stage of institutional formation, ramification and professionalization, remaining at the same time under control of the Central authorities. Kappeler notes that historians had to avoid delicate topics related to conquest, colonization and inclusion into Russian empire as well as those concerning national movements and national policy. At the same time they achieved significant progress in social and economic history⁶.

G.Bordugov and V.Bukharaev believe that local historiographies were not in a position to create national schools because they were under a strong pressure of official Soviet ideology⁷.

A number of researchers believe that national historiographical schools inheriting the tradition of historiographies before the Revolution had existed until the mid-1920's. Afterwards, under the pressure of repression, they ceased to exist and reappeared again only in the perestroika era. Thus, historians from Uzbekistan are of the opinion that it is only justified to refer to Central Asian

historiography of 1917-1923, since by mid-1923 the party control over ideology, people's minds, and scientific assessment of developments taking place in Turkestan asserted itself conclusively⁸.

After the disintegration of the USSR, the intensive revision of history, the abandonment of uniform ideology accompanied the formation of new independent states. During that process the 'national history schools' were formed very quickly, whereas national histories received the status of official historiographies. However, majority of the historians, whose views had shaped in the Soviet era, consider history as an ideological instrument wielded by administrative authorities. Because of this, without any objections they started accommodating the needs of the new commanding elites concerned with legitimizing their rule. As a result, by the mid-90's there emerged a lot of conflicts sprang from ethnocentric interpretation of wars and colonization, and the separation of historical and cultural legacies. Besides, a range of problems came to light pertaining to the formation of national histories in Central Asia: They are as follows:

1. History is primarily viewed as national ideology or national idea, whereas historical experience is construed mainly from ethno-national positions. This results in a loss of scientific basis of history turning the latter into a branch of art, politics, journalism rather than science.
2. The formation of national histories in Central Asian countries faces some serious methodological difficulties. They include:
 - A. A need for modernization and distortion of history- since before the USSR no national state had existed in Central Asia, and ethnic component of population identity had been much less important than confessional, religious, and professional components of identity. Practice has shown that it is impossible to compile an ethnically oriented history of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan without resorting to distortions, modernization and falsification of historical events and phenomena.
 - B. Differences in methodological approaches employed by historians in different Central Asian countries- in countries with Turkic population (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) national histories are developed as histories of territories. It is an approach whereby all historic personalities and artifacts related to the territory where a certain ethnos lives is considered to be its cultural legacy⁹. The "territorial" criterion in

construction of ethnic past was shaped for the first time into a mature methodological doctrine in Turkish historical science in the first half of the 20th century which affected historical interpretations in other countries with Turkic heritage and culture.

As opposed to the "history of territories", the historical concept of the Tajiks is based on the language, culture and literature. The historical perception for a Tajik individual is primarily based on the history of Farsi-Dari-Tajik language and literature. The link between history and philological sciences is an important trait of historical perception in Tajikistan¹⁰.

The differences among methodological approaches alongside with nationalism create grounds for conflicts in Central Asian countries. By way of example one can refer to the problem of Bukhara and Samarkand, where diametrically opposite views are held by historians from different Central Asian countries. These views are related both to the ethno-genesis of peoples of Central Asia, the relationship between nomads and settled (agricultural) populations, and Aryan civilization in general. The picture of complexity of historical thought under transformation in Central Asian countries would be incomplete if we do not mention the problem of hermeneutic circles that are common in historical sciences in general: i.e. the infeasibility to separate the subject of research from its object, and also the problem of introducing the elements of studying culture into the one under study.

For More Clarity – A Brief Outline of Some of the Elements of the Central Asian History which are Challenging and Disputed

Shared Bukharan Civilization

The area encompassed by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and southern Kazakhstan, commonly called Central Asia in the restricted sense of the term, had been in pre-Soviet times been united under a single political authority and had failed to be conquered several times. For instance, after the Arab conquest, Central Asia was united under the Abbasids in 750.¹¹ The area now in the territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was also controlled by the Samanid dynasty from 895-1000 CE.

When the Samanids took control of this area, they established their capital in Bukhara.¹² The expansion of science and literature under the Samanids was not just limited to a narrow stratum in its effects. The standard of living and the general literacy level also

improved. This prosperity of learning, together with the high reputation of the Islamic theologians of Bukhara, made the Samanid era a golden age in the history of Islamic governance¹³. The language of the Samanid court was both Persian and Arabic and the writers of Bukhara introduced literary Persian. To represent the past glory and future potential of the Persian-speaking Tajiks and to assert its role as a guardian of Persian culture, the government of Tajikistan claims that the Samanids represent the manifestation of Tajik national consolidation.¹⁴ The legacy of the Samanid era, represented by scientists and writers such as Al Bukhari, Al-Biruni, constitutes a Bukharan civilizational heritage that is shared by Uzbeks and Tajiks.¹⁵ The intellectual accomplishment of the Samanid era, evolved from the symbiosis between Arabic and Persian cultures and literatures. The role of Turkic groups rose as Turkish slaves served as palace guards, generals and governors. However, the Samanid dynasty, weakened through the insurgency of the Turkish slaves that controlled the Samanid armies, leading to the rise of the Turkic Ghaznavids¹⁶. Finally, the Turkic Qarakhanids conquered Bukhara in 999 A.D. Other periods of unified political control include after the conquest by Chingiz Khan (1162-1227) and by Amir Timur (1335-1404- known in the West as Tamerlane)¹⁷. Chingiz Khan united various Turkic tribes with Mongol tribes under his leadership. Although the conquests of Amir Timur are infamous for their cruelty, the decimation of populations and the destruction of material cultures, his reign is also significant for the promotion of science and art in the capital of his empire, Samarkand. He brought back to Samarkand artisans, craftsmen, scientists, writers, and other intellectuals taken captive during his conquests¹⁸. As the capital of an empire, Samarkand developed into a significant city. The Timurids represent a Turkic regime that preceded the development of ethnic group identity under any Uzbek name. Turkic tribes under Shaybani Khan, using the name "Uzbek," conquered this region of Central Asia in 1501—four hundred years after the Samanid era. Bukhara is located within the present territory of Uzbekistan and the form of nationalism pursued by the government of Uzbekistan prioritizes territory. The government of Uzbekistan appropriates the accomplishments of intellectuals of the Samanid era, such as the famous physician Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna in the West) as symbols of national ethnic glory. This cultural nationalism introduces competition and tension.¹⁹ Many Tajiks see policies of the government of Uzbekistan today as a

reflection of this historical theme of antagonism between Turks and Persians. However, cultural anthropologists argue that because of the high rates of intermarriage, bilingualism and the long history of living together, Uzbeks and Tajiks should be regarded as linked symbiotically. They question the separation and distinction of Tajik and Uzbek identities²⁰. In many areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, such a distinction is purely of political convenience. Tajik cultural nationalists say that Tajiks and Uzbeks share the Turko-Persian civilization that reached its highest point in Bukhara, especially during the Samanid era²¹. A man recorded as 'Uzbek' in his passport may have a sister recorded as 'Tajik' and parents recorded as Tajiks may have children recorded as Uzbeks.²² Some of the poets honored by both Tajiks and Uzbeks wrote in both Tajik and Uzbek²³ languages. As documented by the Tajik nationalist academic, Rahim Masov, Uzbekistan's state policy of forced assimilation of Tajiks can explain the unrealistically low census numbers of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and the high numbers of Tajiks in Tajikistan having the Uzbek²⁴ ethnicity. This policy has fomented considerable political tension.

To summarize, we need to acknowledge that geopolitical events often determine the way the history is perceived. But they should not impose conditions on historians. Educational literature on history should not turn into a political instrument of ruling elites. History of regions, history of peoples comprising various states, history of emigration and diaspora, as well as international history must complement traditional history of nations and states. This is more important in the era of globalization. A wide historical context suggests the need for historians to distance themselves, to a certain degree, from the idea of nationalism. However, one needs to be aware of the fact that it would be naive to expect objective approach and academic ethics from those specialists who shape their own new "mythologies" and create new representations of history proceeding from "national ideas". They do it consciously in accordance with the social and political order.

While acknowledging this, one has to bear in mind that there are circumstances that prevent unrestrained transformation of historical science as a servant of ideology:

- 1) when historians turn into a group, which directly serves the needs of nationalistic regimes, leads to the loss of scientific nature of the works of these historians and transforms history into fiction.

- 2) The needs of contemporary education make it incumbent to address purely scientific tasks.
- 3) And last, but not the least, political circles are aware of the danger of conflicts engendered by nationalization of history. In 2005, the presidents of the CIS countries signed the declaration "On establishment and development of a common scientific and educational space of CIS countries". In late 2005, the meeting of chairmen of historical research institutions of CIS countries was convened in Moscow, where the problems of textbooks and educational literature caused by revision of history in post-soviet countries were discussed. As a result of the meeting, it was recommended to strengthen the role of community of academic historians in preparation of textbooks, to create expert councils comprising of the most competent scientists, school and university teachers. It was also decided that an Association of historical research institutes of CIS countries should be established, and workshops for young historians, exchange and study programs for historians should be carried out.

Thus, the need to develop historical science as a branch of science rather than a form of national ideology poses some serious challenges before the community of researchers in history. To address these challenges, dialogues and meetings among historians from different countries are needed, as well as the speeding up of international cooperation among research institutions working in the field of history. We need to analyze not only an establishment of multiple interpretations of the past, but also ways in which scientists influence creation of "understanding" rather than "separating" historiography.

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 - 11 Kirill Nourzhanov, "The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Samanids" *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, (Winter 2001). [<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200101/0101a003.htm>] Accessed September 30, 2002.
 - 12 "All of the Samanid rulers are called amir in the sources, which in that age meant something like viceroy of the caliph, who himself was amir of all the Muslims." R. N. Frye, "The Samanids," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 4, The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs*" ed, R. N. Frye, 136-161, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975) (141).
 - 13 Soucek claims that the efflorescence of spiritual, intellectual and artistic life in the Samanid domains cannot be separated from similar progress in other parts of the Islamic world including Khwarazm. Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). According to Negmatov, because the Samanid's strong centralized state was able to shield Transoxiana and Khorasan from large-scale external attack, then agriculture, craftsmanship, learning, literature, and art developed. N. N. Negmatov, "The Samanid State," in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. IV Part One*, ed. M. S. Asimov and C. E. Bosworth, 77-94, (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1998).
 - 14 In Morgan's view although the Samanids were of Persian origin, they did not emphasize their Persian identity in the manner of the Saffarids. David Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040-1797*, (New York: Longman, 1988). This national consciousness began as one side of the opposition between the Persians and "Turan," which means all Turkic people as a whole. This opposition forms a central theme in the epic Persian nationalist work *Shahname*, by Abdul Qasim Firdowsi.
 - 15 Rayhan al-Biruni was an encyclopedist, writing important books on India, astronomy, mathematics and geology.
 - 16 "The Ghaznavids (989-1149) were essentially Persianized Turks who in the manner of the pre-Islamic Persians encouraged the development of high culture." Robert L. Canfield, "Introduction: The Turko-Persian Tradition,

- in *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert L. Canfield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 8. The Qarakhanids (999-1140) conquered the Turkish generals of the Samanid regime and they developed a new Turkish literature to compete with Persian and Arabic literature.
- 17 It became caliphate policy to annex Transoxiana in 705 under Walid I and this was accomplished in 715. Kirill Nourzhanov, "The Politics of History," *ibid.*
 - 18 According to Shirin Akiner, Tamerlane (1336-1405) represented a fusion of elements. "An Islamicized Turkified Mongol, he made Samarkand his capital and beautified it with superb buildings and gardens, encouraged science and the arts, yet retained the restless ferocity, even barbarity of a nomad chief." Shirin Akiner, "Post Soviet Central Asia: Past is Prologue," in *The New States of Central Asia and Their Neighbours*, ed. Peter Ferdinand, 4-35 (New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs—Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 8-9.
 - 19 According to Uzbek state ideology, because the existing population derives from intermarriage between the invading Uzbek tribes and the indigenous inhabitants, the present citizens are justified in claiming the heritage of the civilization that preceded the Uzbek conquest as well as the name "Uzbek" and the accomplishments of later times. So the state shows no discomfort about the fact that all of the cultural heroes lived before the advance of Turkic tribes into Mawarannahr in the 14th and 15th Centuries, and that these personalities would not have identified with the tribes they considered barbaric. Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Nation-Building in Uzbekistan," *Central Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (1996) 23-32. See also Igor Torbakov: "Tajik-Uzbek Relations: Divergent National Historiographies Threaten To Aggravate Tensions" 6/12/01. [<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/culture/articles/eav061201.shtml>]. [Accessed January 7, 2002].
 - 20 John Schoeberlein-Engel, "Conflict in Tajikistan and Central Asia: The Myth of Ethnic Animosity," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 1, no. 2 (1994).
 - 21 "However, the often presented picture of an undifferentiated pluralistic, multilingual, tolerant community united by a common faith is, as Muriel Atkin points out, too neat." That claim ignores 14 centuries of constant warfare and Tajik awareness of their special Persian culture. Isabelle T. Kreindler, "Soviet Muslims: Gains and Losses as a Result of Soviet Language Planning," in *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, ed. Yaacov Ro'i, 187-204, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 188.
 - 22 "In towns such as Khojent (Leninabad until 1991), the second largest city in Tajikistan, populations are so intermixed and bilingual that two brothers born of the same parents in the same location can be different ethnically today: one can be Uzbek and the other Tajik. Babajon Ghafurov (d. 1977), the well-known Tajik head of Soviet orientologists from 1956 until his death, is an example of such a situation." Eden Naby, "The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions," in *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the*

- Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 34-55 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 38.
- 23 Alisher Navoi wrote in both Tajik and Uzbek and is honored for his poems in both languages.
- 24 "A famous ethnographer, Yelena Peshereva, who was active in establishing ethnic and republican borders in Central Asian, confessed at the end of her career that during the first Soviet census she had given birth to thousands of Tajiks' by simply registering them as such, to suit the purposes of the Committee on national-territorial delimitation. Even more Tajiks were registered as Uzbeks."²⁴

About the Authors

Hari Vasudevan, Director, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata.

Denis Ananyev, Fellow, Institute of History, SBRAS, Novosibirsk, Russia.

Marina N. Baldano, Head, Department of History, Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Ulan Ude, Russia.

Viktor I. Dyatlov, Professor of the World History and International Relations' Department, Irkutsk State University, Russia.

Mirzoid Rakhimov, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Institute of Oriental Studies, Tashkent.

Muzaffar A. Olimov, Tajik National University, Center for Study of the Tajiks of the world, Tajikistan.



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